by Maxime Gauin
The Tsarist empire had been built on limitless conquests and collapsed in 1917, because its ambitions exceeded by far its possibilities.[i] The USSR collapsed in 1991 because it could not cope the Western challenge, especially the Strategic Defense Initiative launched by President Ronald Reagan, and because of the costly invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989).
There is no exaggeration in affirming that Vladimir Putin’s Russia is the heir of USSR. It is ruled by a former KGB agent, who called the end of the Soviet Union the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the end of 20th century.” The purge in Italy in 1943-1946 was not perfect, far from that, but nobody could have imagined, during the 1960s, an Italian chief of government who would have been a former Organization for Vigilance and Repression of Anti-Fascism (OVRA) officer, stating that the collapse of the Fascist Empire (Libya, Albania, Greece, Ethiopia and Eritrea) was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of mid-20th century. The aim of this article is to demonstrate why we are close to collapse similar to those of 1917 and 1991, and for similar reasons. The Russian military power is vanishing; its economy is on the verge of bankruptcy; and its network of alliances is declining.
The lethal attrition suffered by the Russian military
Any political power is based, for a part, on military capacities. A famous saying attributed to Otto von Bismarck affirms, and not without valuable reasons: “Diplomacy without weapons is music without instruments.” This is even truer for Russia, which inherited from the Soviet Union the biggest conventional army of the world and biggest number of nuclear warheads. Yet, this arsenal is disappearing, the human resources are collapsing and the nuclear blackmail is losing its credibility.
Since the Second World War, two of the main strong points of the Soviet/Russian conventional army have been the artillery and the armored vehicles—less for their quality than for their quantity. The quality has been confirmed to be low and the quantity now belongs to the past. The stockpiles of heavy mortars (since 2024) and MT-LB armored personnel carriers (since last winter) are purely and simply empty, as prove the satellites photos. Those of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) have melted by more than 80% and the remaining systems are in a quite debatable shape. The half of the self-propelled artillery systems present in the Russian depots in 2022 had already disappeared in December 2024, due to the destructions of the war, and the other half is at best hard to repair. A more recent zoom on the Omsk arsenal confirms both the losses and the damages caused to the remaining artillery systems by the Russian weather and the poor conditions of storage. The stockpiles of towed artillery are similarly decreasing and it is estimated by the open sources analysts that, at the end of 2025, the depots will contain only cannons of the Stalinist years, yet their range is too short for modern warfare, to say nothing about their shape after more than seven decades. The situation is not better for the tanks: At the current rhythm, in the end of 2025, the stockpiles will contain wrecks only.[ii]
Yet, March 2025 was marked by the record of destruction of Russian artillery systems by the Ukrainian forces. Certainly, Russia continues to produce some armored vehicles, main battle tanks for example (after an interruption due to the sanctions in 2022), but the quantities leaving the factories until now have been dramatically insufficient to compensate the losses. For example, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the production of new tanks to be between 60 and 70 for the whole year 2023.[iii] Yet, the international sanctions have been hardened step by step, including the secondary ones, in order to prevent third parties from delivering a sufficient quantity of electronic and mechanical components.
These information can be cross-check with the rise of the share of civilian vehicles in the proved Russian losses. In January and February 2025, the all-terrain vehicles represented roughly one quarter of these losses, while the trucks, the civilian cars and the infantry mobility vehicles (IMVs) represented the half. Even in deducing the IMVs, the majority of the Russian losses are made of trucks and civilian vehicles—while the rate of such vehicles is stable among the proved losses of the Ukrainian army. Similarly, the import, by Russia, of 120 self-propelled artillery systems and 120 MLRS from North Korea[iv] is evidence of dramatic lack of Russian-made firepower. These imports delay the inevitable, but, beside the fact that the rhythm of destruction of the Russian army’s artillery by the Ukrainian forces has spectacularly increased, Kim Jong-Un will not empty his reserves for Vladimir Putin.
The dependence on North Korea is also visible in artillery shells: In 2024, about the half of the artillery ammunitions fired by the Russian gunners were made in DPRK.[v] Yet, during the first months of deliveries, North Korea emptied its oldest stockpiles (which provoked accidental explosions of Russian cannons), so the capacity of exports in 2025 cannot be the same anymore, even less as the Russian artillery units are sceptical about the accuracy and safety of the North Korean ammunitions. To make the situation only more complicated, the Ukrainian forces have destroyed major ammunitions’ depots in Russia, for instance those of Toporets on 18 and 21 September 2024, Karachev on 9 October of the same year, Selydove on 28 February 2025 and Barvoso on 22 April. In total, out of the seven biggest depots existing west of the Urals, four have been ravaged so far, in eight months.[vi] The total of the super-depots is eleven. In other words, the Russian army is not running out of munitions in a near future, but the logistics is downgraded and made much more complicated, and the strikes are far from being terminated. If the Ukrainian manages to destroy before the end of this year the three other super-depots west to the Urals, the situation could look like a nightmare in terms of munitions, too.
Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to receive Western howitzers, especially the French CAESARs (more than 100 pledged for 2025[vii]) and the Swedish Archers (18 pledged for 2025), the most precise. The Ukrainian production of Bodhana howitzers, which was six per month in 2023, is 20 per month currently.[viii] The European supplies of shells and the national production now are sufficient, in dramatic contrast with the first semester of 2024.
The losses are also human. On 3 May 2025, the British Ministry of Defense estimated the Russian casualties to be about 950,000 (dead or seriously wounded), including 160,000 in 2025 only.
As this graph proves, since May 2024, the daily Russian loses have always been in excess of 1,000; yet, the recruitment during the last twelve months has varied between 5/600 and 1,000.[ix] In other words, the human mass is melting. Moreover, these losses are not those of aging volunteers, conditionally released prisoners and unexperienced soldiers only. On 11 May 2025, the death in action of 5,969 Russian officers (including ten generals and 107 colonels) had been proved, by Russian sources (obituaries and graves). This figure does not include the deaths impossible to prove beyond any doubt and the officers who are too seriously wounded to command anymore.
Russia had bragged about its “unstoppable” hypersonic missiles, Kinzhal and Zircon (able to wear nuclear warheads), yet both models can be intercept by American Patriots and by French-Italian SAMP/T.[x] The Patriots have also intercepted ballistic missiles. Yet, so far, Ukraine has not received any Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, specifically designed for ballistic missiles. The Aster B1 NT, the new munition of the SAMP/T, able to shot down ballistic missiles up to Mach 15 (such as the Russian Topol-M and Oreshnik) is completing its tests.[xi] As a result, there is a definitely a need for more systems in Ukraine, EU and America, but technologically speaking, the battle is won.
Correspondingly, the Sarmat, an intercontinental ballistic missile widely used by Russian propaganda since 2022, to scare the Western public opinions, has failed in two of the three tests made so far. The second failure was an explosion of the missile in the silo, leaving a crater about 60 metres (200 feet) wide, destroying the launching site,[xii] and possibly killing technicians and engineers. Two other tests have been cancelled at the last moment. Yet, the Sarmat was supposed to replace in 2020 (yes) the R-36, a Soviet missile designed during the 1960s by Ukrainian engineers. As the Russian engineers could not maintain the R-36s, an agreement was signed in 2006 with Kyiv in this regard. Needless to say, the R-36s are not maintained anymore since 2014, yet, like the Sarmat, the R-36 uses highly toxic propellants, which corrode the tanks. This is not the only gap of this kind. From 2005 to 2017, the half of the tests of the Bulava, the Russian submarine-launched ballistic missile, were complete or partial failures.[xiii] The missile experienced still another failure on 1 November 2023.[xiv]
The Russian strategic bombers (with nuclear capacity) Tu-22 have been designed during the 1960s and the last one was produced in 1993. Due to the time and the international sanctions, the accidents are more frequent: At least one in October 2022, one in April 2023, one in August 2024 and one in April 2025. The Ukrainian forces destroyed at least another one in August 2023 and one in April 2025.[xv] Yet the total of operational Russian strategic bombers, including the propeller planes Tu-95, was estimated to be 50 in 2022. [xvi] These are not minor losses, even less in considering the fact these plane would be in a more appropriate place in a museum.
When ambitions exceed capacities: The sinking Russian economy
The economic and financial issues are even more linked to the conduct of the war as the majority of proved Russian losses are volunteers are volunteers, attracted by particularly high salaries and promises of pensions for their widow. Since summer 2024, a volunteer is paid 400,000 roubles ($4,651), while the Russian minimum wage is 22,440 roubles.[xvii] Yet, the Russian state, targeted by heavy sanctions, is in deficit since 2022, and nobody wants to buy the Russian debt abroad, not only because of the sanctions and because of what happened to the Tsarist debt after 1917, but above all because the trust in the Russian capacity to reimburse is minimal. In such circumstances, Russia has no choice but to borrow money on its soil and even more to empty its national wealth fund.[xviii] In March 2025, the Russian news agency Interfax announced: “The volume of liquid assets in the National Wealth Fund (NWF) reached a record low of 32.1% of its total volume by the beginning of 2025, according to data included in an analytical note from the Accounts Chamber on executing the 2024 federal budget.” The share was 58.8% two years before.[xix] On 12 May 2025, the official news agency TASS announced that the absolute amount of liquid assets had diminished again: 3.297 trillion rubles (vs. 3.81 last winter). The fund has no dollars and pounds since 2023, no euros since 2024. In other words, there is no strong currency anymore. The non-liquid assets are negligible: The value of the shares of Aeroflot Company, for instance, is artificially inflated. Who would like to buy them?
Could at least Russia pay in yellow metal? Less and less. The gold reserves of the Russian Central Bank have dropped by 46.4% in 2024,[xx] while Russia was the second biggest producer of gold in the world last year. The cost of the war is indeed becoming unbearable. The accumulation of primary and secondary sanctions on semi-conductors, mechanical components and other pieces indispensable for the war[xxi] mean more money to pay to third-parties, for less imports. In addition to Kazakhstan (see below) Turkey, for instance, started implementing the bank sanctions.[xxii] Even more importantly, the rise of secondary sanctions on the bank sector provoked, mostly in 2024, a departure of the Chinese banks from Russia. More and more Chinese banks also refuse the payments in yuans from Russia. The Russian cryptocurrency, presented last year as the ultimate alternative, has been sanctioned by the U.S. since April 2022[xxiii] and by the European Union since February 2025.
The financial situation has devastating effects on the national economy in general. The Russian Central Bank’s key rate is hopelessly fixed to 21%, which means loans at 25-30% for the individuals and companies. This is impossible to invest in such conditions. Yet, less investments means less taxes. The high rate of interest is already decreasing the capacity of the companies to pay their subcontractors and providers. The recent drop of the oil prices during the last months only worsen the situation for Russia, a country heavily depend on hydrocarbons exports. In this context, Swedish economist Anders Åslund considers the possibility of a Russian bankruptcy at the end of 2025 (by shortage of liquid reserves) to be likely.[xxiv]
Mr. Åslund’s estimate should be taken even more seriously as the sanctions and the cost of the war impact an already weakened economy. Russia is targeted by sanctions since 2014. The Russian GDP in dollars never recovered its level of 2013, due to the sanctions and the decrease of the oil prices. Even before 2014, the Russian suffered a kind of “Dutch disease,” namely one sector (oil and gas) concentrating the investments and the most qualified employees, at the detriment of the other sectors. The corruption at every level of the state is another fundamental weakness. The Mafia is even worse. Lieutenant General Michel Yakovleff, deputy chief of staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe from 2014 to 2016, called the Russian economy a “bonsai economy,” because every time a start-up reaches a certain level, the Mafia forces the owners to sale the company at a cheap price, so the CEOs block the development of their own companies. The result is: Morocco has a bigger industrial production per capita than Russia; Russian engineers and entrepreneurs are emigrating since two or three decades.
Moreover, the European leaders have warned that a refusal of the proposed truce for 30 days would provoke a new packet of sanctions, designed in coordination with the bill prepared by U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham. Yet, this truce has been refused by Russia on 11 and 12 May.
Increasing isolation: The decline of alliances and soft power
Former Soviet and Communist countries
Kazakhstan remains a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), unlike Azerbaijan, which left in 1999, Georgia, which has quitted the CSTO the same year, and Uzbekistan, which left for good in 2012. This is even the only country where the mechanism of mutual military assistance was implemented, in January 2022. Regardless, the slow movement of distancing, which started in 2009 (establishment of the Organization of Turkic States), and was confirmed in 2014 (rapprochement with the European Union and particularly France, after the illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea), accelerated just before the general invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, Kazakhstan refused in February 2022 to recognize the self-proclaimed “republics” on Donbas, then to send troops to Russia in order to contribute to the invasion. Instead, Astana sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine.[xxv] More recently, Kazakhstan started implementing the sanctions: The largest Russian state-owned bank, Sberbank, had to leave the country and restrictions have been imposed to the export and re-export to Russia for 106 categories of goods, including parts of drones and chips.
In 2024, Kazakhstan has modified its immigration and naturalization law: Successfully passing a history and language test now is obligatory in order to obtain the Kazakh citizenship and double nationals can lose their Kazakh passport. Clearly, these measures are designed for Russian immigrants, and Moscow reacted with powerless anger.[xxvi] As a result, the visit of President Kassym-Jomart Kemeluly Tokayev in Moscow for the parade of 9 May 2025 should not be overrated. No tangible announce followed this short trip.
Similar comments can be made about Serbia, the old ally of Tsarist Russia, supported (verbally) by Moscow during the Kosovo war, in 1999. Belgrade quietly arms Ukraine, at least since winter 2022-2023.[xxvii] After having preferred the French Rafale to the Russian jets in August 2024, the Serbian government ended purely and simply, in January 2025, the imports of Russian military equipment.[xxviii] Not unlike the participation of the Kazakh leader, the one of President Aleksandar Vučić to the Moscow parade of 9 May is a symbolic gesture, which pales in comparison with his concrete actions. Mr. Vučić had a joint press conference with the president of the European Council on 13 May.
More complicated, but not less spectacular, is the evolution in Armenia. I will always remember my professor of Russian geography at Paris-I-Sorbonne University calling this country “a branch of Russia” in 2007, due, especially, to its economic dependency on its big brother. As late as February 2022, Armenia was the only state to side with Russia in voting against the suspension of the aggressor at the Council of Europe.[xxix] The position started changing after the clashes at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border (not yet delineated) in autumn 2022. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan accepted to sign the EU-brokered declaration of Prague, by which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognized their territorial integrity mutually. After that, there was no major clash anymore. Slowly in 2023, more rapidly in 2024, Armenian distanced itself from Russia—in spite of the vehement protests from the diaspora’s organizations, which remain fully Putinist. In particular, in August 2024, the Russian Federal Service (FSB) left the international airport of Yerevan, ending 32 years of control of the passengers’ passports and of the Armenian airspace.[xxx] That having been said, only the signature of the (now entirely written) peace treaty with Azerbaijan and the subsequent establishment of normal relations with Turkey will permit to end the economic dependence of Armenia on Russia (and Iran).
In any case, the biggest loss of Russian among the post-Communist countries is of course Ukraine itself. Viktor Yanukovitch, the Russian-oriented Ukrainian President from 2010 to 2014, served as prototype for the Russian-backed, corrupt, clannish and authoritarian kind of leader Vladimir Putin has tried to promote in Europe and elsewhere. Mr. Yanukovytch served as an instrument for Mr. Putin’s retribution, for instance with the unfair trial of past President Yulia Tymochenko, sentenced to seven years in jail in October 2011, a verdict which provoked the cancellation, by the European Union, of a visit of Mr. Yanukovytch in Brussels.[xxxi] That outcome was of course seen with pleasure in the Kremlin. But Mr. Yanukovytch finished his presidential term early, overthrown by the people, disliked by the majority of his compatriots for his practice of electoral fraud, the recurrence of corruption around him (with his personal participation) and the confiscation of power by men coming from the Donbas.[xxxii] Both before and after the invasion of Crimea and of a part of the Donbas in 2014-2015, the Russian propaganda machine widely described the European Union as “Gayropa,” crudely distorting the issue of LGBT rights promoted by Brussels.[xxxiii] Today, there are self-identified homosexual and bisexual Ukrainian soldiers on the frontline, especially the Unicorn Battalion.
Even more remarkably, 34% of the Ukrainians spoke Russian at home in 2005, but only 24 % en 2020, six years after the invasion of 2014, and 16 % in 2023; 64, 74 and 82% spoke Ukrainian there. Far from Russifying Ukraine, Mr. Putin’s imperialism has done more than anyone and anything else in a century to boost Ukrainian patriotism.
Western Europe and Latin America
As such, the kind of Reactionary International the Kremlin tried to establish at its profit is not something new. The Communist International existed 1919 to 1943, was succeed by the Cominform from 1947 to 1956, then by an informal control of Moscow on the Western Communist Parties until late 1980s. Two thirds of the Soviet funding for the Communist parties in the word were sent the CPs Western Europe in 1966 (namely after most of the African and Asian independences).[xxxiv] The Kremlin and its relay in the West started promoting Russia as the patria of retrieved conservative values as early as 1990s. But, of course, this narrative gained in importance after the radicalization of the regime, internally and externally, in 2011-2012,[xxxv] and after the sanctions of 2014.
In France, the far right had welcomed White Russian émigrés by 1920s and took inspiration from them.[xxxvi] The National Front (FN) was uncompromisingly anti-Communist during the 1970s and 1980s, but it included grandchildren of White Russians, such as Serge de Beketch, known, among things, for his support for Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson. Jean-Marie Le Pen developed friendly relations with ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky by 1990s.[xxxvii] J.-M. Le Pen’s interview to the far rightist weekly Rivarol published on 7 January 2005 was mostly noticed for this sentence: “At least in France, the German occupation was not particularly inhuman, even if there were blunders, inevitable in a country of 550 000 square kilometres.” But in the same interview, he stated that Russia would invade Ukraine if the Ukrainians turned to the West completely. Six months later, he visited Moscow and affirmed during an interview to the radio Echo of Moscow: “We must now think about creating a ‘boreal space’ from Brest to Vladivostok.”[xxxviii] “Boreal space” was hardly understandable for most of the listeners, and probably for most of the readers of this article, but this is a clear reference for those who belong to the radical far right: This is an expression taken from the projects of German-Soviet alliance advocated by the National-Bolsheviks (non-Nazi far right) during the Weimar Republic, projects updated by neo-Fascists and neo-Nazis across Europe after 1945.[xxxix]
That makes even more understandable the deal between the National Front, led since 2011 by Marine Le Pen, and the Kremlin in 2014: A loan of € 9 million euros and a bonus of € 225,000 for a support for the illegal annexation of Crimea.[xl] (For the American readers, it is important to emphasize that France has one of toughest legislations in the world in terms of spending limits for the political campaigns, and that the donations to political parties by companies are strictly prohibited since 1995.) Even after the invasion of 2022, the far rightist party remained the main relay of the Russian propaganda in France, to undermine the support for Ukraine.[xli]
Regardless, this attempt of the Kremlin had quite limited effects. Indeed, Ms. Le Pen has been defeated in 2017 and 2022. The National Front (now named National Rally) failed to have a majority at the National Assembly in 2024, after a campaign marked by a complete amateurism and numerous scandals—including Russia-related ones—concerning candidates.[xlii] Then, as it is widely known, Ms. Le Pen has been sentenced to two years under electronic bracelet, € 100,000 of fine and five years of ineligibility, this last sentence being pronounced with provisory execution (which means she is already ineligible, in spite of the appeal). Now, the pro-Ukrainian minority is louder than ever in the National Rally. This could be attributed, at least for a part, to Ms. Le Pen’s judicary issues.
United Kingdom was a top target for the Soviet Services during the Cold War, in spite of its tiny Communist Party. The story of the “Cambridge Magnificent Five” is well known. In spite of the discovery of this ring of spies, the staff of the Soviet embassy in London bypassed the one of Washington during the 1960s. In 1971, 105 Soviet agents (often under diplomatic cover) were expelled, the absolute record for a Western democracy during the Cold War (other agents were expelled in 1985 and 1989). After the affirmation of the Putinist imperial ambitions, Moscow exploited the weakest point in UK, namely the resentment and the prejudices toward the European Union. The biggest success of the Russian destabilization agents in Europe since 1991 is arguably their contribution to the victory of the “Leave” during the referendum of 2016 on the Brexit. One more time, this is not something new: By order of Moscow, the French and Italian Communist Parties campaigned in 1961 against the British candidacy to the European Community.[xliii] But this success is already fading. UK is de facto back in the European defense, as proves, for example, the presence of Prime Minister Keir Stramer together with President Emmanuel Macron, Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Prime Minister Donald Tusk to the recent meeting in Ukraine. The Reform UK party, whose stance on Russian is lenient, to say the very least, has only two deputies at the House of Commons, after the elections of July 2024. The results of the local elections of May 2025 are more concerning, but they did not make magically disappear the internal dissensions in the Reform UK party.
Italy, too, was an important target for the USSR during the Cold War, because of its considerable Communist Party and its political instability. Putinist Russia bet a lot on the League, transformed by Matteo Salvini from a separatist party to a nation-wide—and still far rightist—one. The League signed a partnership with United Russia, Mr. Putin’s party, in 2017. The Kremlin surely was glad when the League arrived in power in 2018. Regardless, Mr. Salvini voted the sanctions during the first months of the war, then, in 2022, he had to leave the leadership of the Italian right to Giorgia Meloni, who has not ties with the Kremlin. In April 2024, the League denounced its accord with United Russia.[xliv] Coincidence of the calendar, the same month, the British Ministry of Defense revealed that the Meloni cabinet had given Scalp/Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine.[xlv]
Germany was Communist, for its eastern part, until 1989-1990, and the Federal Republic was a bête noire for the USSR, which took profit of the division of the country to infiltrate countless agents in the flow of Eastern German refugees, some of them having never been discovered. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) has fought the German aid to Ukraine even more fiercely than the National Rally and the Reform UK Party in their respective countries, but was clearly defeated by the CDU-CSU in February 2025. After decades of pro-Russian wandering by both Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel, after years of “pacifism” with Olaf Scholz, Germany has found a firm and European chancellor.
It is also important to notice that a part of the European radical rights never nurtured illusions about Russia. In Spain, Vox considers the Putin regime to be an attempted resurrection of the USSR (so, something like the absolute evil) and unconditionally supports Ukraine since February 2022.[xlvi] Norway’s Progress Party approves the military aid to Ukraine in clear terms. Even more importantly, because this party now is in power, the Belgian N-VA has increased the national military budget in general and the aid for Ukraine in particular. Actually, the Russian rate of divorce, AIDS rate, alcohol consumption, murder rate and religious practice have nothing to please conservatives or far rightists, if they are coherent with themselves. Russian “conservatism” is a Potemkin one.
In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, the far rightist president from 2019 to 2023, expressed his “solidarity” (sic) with Russia at the eve of the grand invasion of Ukraine then called “futile” the international sanctions.[xlvii] He is now indicted for a failed coup and seriously sick. This is not to pretend, of course, that his successor (and predecessor) Luis Ignacio “Lula” da Silva has stance similar to the British and Norwegian Labour Parties, far from that. But at least, he expresses no “solidarity” with the Russian expansionism.
The “Axis of Resistance”
Similarly, there is hardly anything new with the Russian support for Iran and its proxies: As early as the Baku Congress of 1920, Soviet Russia present itself as anti-colonial champion, including in the Muslim world, and in spite of the extremely violent methods used to re-conquer Azerbaijan and Central Asia.[xlviii] The Stalinist anti-Semitism, predominantly for domestic purpose, was succeeded during the 1960s by an “anti-Zionism” promoted both inside USSR and abroad.[xlix] Waddi Haddad, the leader of the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, established in 1967) became a KGB agent in 1971.[l] The PFLP now is a junior partner of Hamas, in spite of their ideological differences.
Putinist Russia has developed its alliance with Iran in parallel with its increasingly aggressive stance towards the West. The Russian material support and encouragement for the carnage of 7 October 2023[li] was designed to worsen the chaos in the Near and Middle East, and to scatter the Western efforts, especially the American ones, as well as to punish Israel for the project (never implemented) to give to Ukraine de-commissioned main battle tanks under cocoon.
Yet, the results were limited, and to a certain extent, counter-productive. The majority of the Hamas leadership has been eliminated. After having breached in 2023 its historical record with 7,539 strikes, the number of rockets launched from the Gaza strip dropped to 1,470 in 2024 and will probably reached an even lower number this year. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad has lost its “military” chief Jihad Shaker al-Ghannam and suffered other significant losses in 2023-2025. The situation is even worse for Hezbollah. Its 18 “military” top chiefs have been eliminated, like the whole chain of command of the missiles’ units. Considerable stockpiles of Russian weapons have been seized by the Israeli Defense Forces.[lii] As a result, Tehran has lost its main instrument of deterrence against Israel. Iran itself launched two waves of air attacks on Israel and both were mostly failures: No military target was destroyed. The Israeli retaliation strikes of April and October 2024 have downgraded the Iranian air defense systems, making the country even more vulnerable in case of attacks on its nuclear plants.
Regardless, the worst loss for Russia in the region was the collapse of the Baath regime in Syria, the oldest ally of Moscow in the region, largely because the Russian military had diminished as a result of the war in Ukraine, and because the Hezbollah had been beheaded by Israel. There were definitely serious errors of the Israeli cabinet (which are not the subject of this article), but in spite of these flaws, the Russian strategy hardly reached any of its objectives, except preventing (so far) the deliveries of Israeli main battle tanks. Its network of alliance in the Near and Middle East is weaker than ever, at least since decades.
Conclusion
It is too soon to tell when the regime will collapse for good, but it is in an inextricable situation. The economy is militarized but hardly productive, incapable to re-supply the army as much as needed, and unable to transition to peace time. The mass of over-paid volunteers would become a major danger for public order in case of peace. The Russian train has no reverse gear anymore and shall hit the wall. The election of Donald Trump was not the miracle maybe hoped in the Kremlin until recently.
[i] Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War, Cambridge (Massachusetts)-London: Harvard University Press, 2011.
[ii] Perun, “Russian Equipment Reserves: Production, Losses and Storage Depletion,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TzR8BacYS6U; “Frontline report: Russia resorts to Soviet civilian vehicles as Ukraine decimates Russian armor,” Euromaidan Press, 26 March 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/03/26/frontline-report-russia-resorts-to-soviet-civilian-vehicles-as-ukraine-decimates-russian-armor/ ; Covert Cabal, “What Remains of the Centuries Old Omsk Arsenal (94th),” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUbrWvCs3M8
[iii] Michael Gjerstad, “Russian T-90M production: less than meets the eye,” 11 June 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/06/russian-t-90m-production-less-than-meets-the-eye/
[iv] “Thousands of troops, millions of shells,” Reuters, 15 April 2025, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/NORTHKOREA-RUSSIA/lgvdxqjwbvo/
[v] Ibid. ; Open Source Centre, Brothers in Arms: Estimating North Korean Munitions Deliveries to Russia, 2025, https://static.opensourcecentre.org/assets/osc_brothers_in_arms.pdf
[vi] Emmanuel Grynszpan and Benjamin Quénelle, “Ukraine destroys huge Russian ammunition depot,” Lemonde.fr, 18 September 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/09/18/ukraine-destroys-huge-russian-ammunition-depot-with-first-of-its-kind-ground-breaking-innovative-missiles_6726538_4.html; “‘Poof!’: Looks like Ukraine erased 300,000+ tons of Russian ammo,” Euromaidanpress, 25 April 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/04/25/poof-looks-like-ukraine-erased-300000-tons-of-russian-ammo/
[vii] “Le Monde: 90% of Caesar cannon barrels produced by KNDS are being sent to Ukraine,” Euromaidan Press, 22 April 2025, https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/04/22/le-monde-90-of-caesar-cannon-barrels-produced-by-knds-are-being-sent-to-ukraine/
[viii] Sofiia Syngaivska, “Ukrainian 44th Brigade Showed New Bohdana Howitzer With Drone Protection, Semi-Auto Loading, and Small Arms,” Defense Express, 5 May 2025, https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/ukrainian_44th_brigade_showed_new_bohdana_howitzer_with_drone_protection_semi_auto_loading_and_small_arms-14405.html
[ix] “Even after doubling its sign-on bonus payment, the Russian army’s recruitment rate is falling. Losses may now outpace new enlistments,” Meduza, 4 December 2024, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2024/12/04/even-after-doubling-its-sign-on-bonus-payment-the-russian-army-s-recruitment-rate-is-falling-losses-may-now-outpace-new-enlistments ; “At The Current Rate, It Would Take Russia Centuries And Tens Of Millions Of Casualties To Capture Ukraine,” Forbes, 1 May 2025, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2025/05/01/at-the-current-rate-it-would-take-russia-centuries-and-tens-of-millions-of-casualties-to-capture-ukraine/
[x] “Ukraine capable of shooting down Russian Zircon hypersonic missiles – Air Force,” The New Voice of Ukraine, 27 March 2024, https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukraine-uses-european-samp-t-and-american-patriot-systems-to-intercept-russian-zircon-missiles-50404796.html
[xi] “France Tests New Anti-Air Shield with Aster 30 B1NT to Strengthen Future SAMP/T-NG Defense System,” Army Recognition, 8 October 2024, https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/army-news-2024/france-tests-new-anti-air-shield-with-aster-30-b1nt-to-strengthen-future-samp-t-ng-defense-system
[xii] “Images show Russia’s new Sarmat missile suffered major test failure, researchers say,” Reuters, 24 September 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/24/europe/russia-sarmat-missile-test-failure-intl
[xiii] Stéphane Barensky, “Nouvel échec du Boulava”, 30 September 2016, https://www.aerospatium.info/nouvel-echec-boulava/ ; “One Bulava does not make a summer,” https://warsawinstitute.org/one-bulava-does-not-make-a-summer/
[xiv] “Russia fails Yars and Bulava nuclear weapon carrier tests: Ukrainian Intelligence reports,” RBC Ukraine, 4 November 2023, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/russia-fails-yars-and-bulava-nuclear-weapon-1699092844.html
[xv] “ Ukraine destroys valuable Tu-22M3 strategic bomber in drone strike on key Russian airbase,”
[xvi] Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: How many nuclear weapons does Russia have in 2022?”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 23 February 2022, https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-02/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-russia-have-in-2022/
[xvii] “Putin doubles signing bonuses for volunteers to fight in Ukraine”
[xviii] Pierre-Marie Meunier, « “Économie de guerre” : la Russie en cessation de paiements après 2024 ? », Le Rubicon, 24 April 2024, https://lerubicon.org/economie-de-guerre-la-russie-en-cessation-de-paiements-apres-2024/
[xix] “Share of liquid assets in Russia’s NWF drops to record low of 32% by early 2025 – Accounts Chamber,” Interfax, 18 March 2025, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/110426/
[xx] « Les pénuries d’or en Chine et en Russie propulsent le prix mondial à des niveaux record », Business AM, 13 February 2025, https://fr.businessam.be/les-penuries-dor-en-chine-et-en-russie-propulsent-le-prix-mondial-a-des-niveaux-record/
[xxi] David Lawder, “US Treasury widens sanctions to curb Russia’s war production,” Reuters, 12 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-treasury-widens-sanctions-curb-russias-war-production-2024-06-12/
[xxii] “Turkish Banks Close Russian Corporate Accounts Over Secondary Sanctions – Vedomosti,” The Moscow Times, 1 February 2024, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/02/01/turkish-banks-close-russian-corporate-accounts-over-secondary-sanctions-vedomosti-a83935 ; Can Sezer, Nevzat Devranoglu and Dmitry Zhdannikov, “Turkish-Russian trade hit by fresh US sanctions threat,” Reuters, 19 February 2024, https://www.reuters.com/markets/turkish-russian-trade-hit-by-fresh-us-sanctions-threat-2024-02-19/
[xxiii] Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “The Slow Strangulation of Russia Sanctions,” CEPA, 5 September 2024, https://cepa.org/article/the-slow-strangulation-of-russia-sanctions/
[xxiv] “This European economist says Russia could go bankrupt and run out of liquid reserves by fall of 2025; here’s why”, The Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/us/this-european-economist-says-russia-could-go-bankrupt-and-run-out-of-liquid-reserves-by-fall-of-2025-heres-why/articleshow/117270284.cms
[xxv] Georgi Gotev, “Kazakhstan takes distance from Russia’s Ukraine war,” Euractiv, 2 March 2022, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/kazakhstan-takes-distance-from-russias-ukraine-war/ ; Aibarshyn Akhmetakli, “Kazakhstan Sends First Humanitarian Aid Plane to Ukraine Through Poland,” The Astana Time, 14 March 2022, https://astanatimes.com/2022/03/kazakhstan-sends-first-humanitarian-aid-plane-to-ukraine-through-poland/; Dana Omirgazy, “Kazakhstan Delivers $5 Million in Humanitarian Aid in 2023,” The Astana Time, 21 February 2024,https://astanatimes.com/2024/02/kazakhstan-delivers-5-million-in-humanitarian-aid-in-2023/
[xxvi] Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan: Government taking action to promote Kazakh language,” Eurasianet, 3 June 2024, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-government-taking-action-to-promote-kazakh-language
[xxvii] Snezana Rakic, “How did Serbian rockets end up in Ukraine?”, Serbian Monitor, 28 February 2023, https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/how-did-serbian-rockets-end-up-in-ukraine/; Alec Russell and Marton Dunai, “Serbia turns blind eye to its ammunition ending up in Ukraine,” The Financial Times, 22 June 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/136ed721-fd50-4815-8314-d9df8dc67fd6
[xxviii] Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Serbia cancels Russian arms deals amid Ukraine war, Western sanctions,” Defense News, 10 January 2025, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/01/10/serbia-cancels-russian-arms-deals-amid-ukraine-war-western-sanctions/
[xxix] Ani Avetisyan, “Armenia stands alone in support for Russia in Council of Europe,” OC Media, 26 February 2022, https://oc-media.org/armenia-stands-alone-in-support-for-russia-in-council-of-europe/
[xxx] Onnik James Krikorian, “Armenia Ends Russian Oversight at Yerevan Airport as Security Concerns Persist,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15 August 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-ends-russian-oversight-at-yerevan-airport-as-security-concerns-persist/
[xxxi] « Après la condamnation de Ioulia Timochenko, l’UE annule la visite de Viktor Ianoukovitch », Lemonde.fr, 18 October 2011, https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2011/10/18/l-ukraine-rejette-les-pressions-en-faveur-de-ioulia-timochenko_1589418_3214.html
[xxxii] Marie Jégo, « Révolution orange : Viktor Ianoukovitch, chef de clan et président honni », Le Monde, 22 February 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2014/02/21/viktor-ianoukovitch-chef-de-clan-et-president-honni_4371064_3214.html
[xxxiii] Maryna Shevtsova, “Fighting ‘Gayropa’: Europeanization and Instrumentalization of LGBTI Rights in Ukrainian Public Debate,” Problems of Post-Communism, Volume 67, Issue 6, November-December 2020, pp. 500-510, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10758216.2020.1716807
[xxxiv] Marie-Pierre Rey, La Russie face à l’Europe. D’Ivan le Terrible à Vladimir Poutine, Paris : Flammarion, 2022, p. 368.
[xxxv] Ibid., pp. 453-463.
[xxxvi] Nicolas Lebourg and Olivier Schmitt, Paris-Moscou : un siècle d’extrême droite, Paris : Le Seuil, 2024.
[xxxvii] Christian Chombeau, « M. Le Pen justifie ses liens avec M. Jirinovski », Le Monde, 20 February 1996, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1996/02/20/m-le-pen-justifie-ses-liens-avec-m-jirinovski_3707658_1819218.html
[xxxviii] Madeleine Vatel, « Jean-Marie Le Pen vante à Moscou l’“Europe boréale” », Le Monde, 30 June 2005, https://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2005/06/29/jean-marie-le-pen-vante-a-moscou-l-europe-boreale_667346_3214.html
[xxxix] Stéphane François, Au-delà des vents du Nord. L’extrême droite française, le pôle Nord et les Indo-Européens, Lyon : Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2014.
[xl] Agathe Duparc, Antton Rouget et Marine Turchi, « La vraie histoire du financement russe de Le Pen », Mediapart, 2 May 2017, https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/020517/la-vraie-histoire-du-financement-russe-de-le-pen;Marine Turchi, « En marge du prêt russe au RN : 255 000 euros ont été versés en échange de positions pro-Poutine », Mediapart, 27 June 2024, https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/270624/en-marge-du-pret-russe-au-rn-255-000-euros-ont-ete-verses-en-echange-de-positions-pro-poutine
[xli] Catherin Belton, “Russia is working to subvert French support for Ukraine, documents show,” The Washington Post, 30 December 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/12/30/france-russia-interference-far-right/
[xlii] Marine Turchi and Lou Osborne, « Législatives : quinze candidats RN ont entretenu des liens directs avec la Russie de Poutine », Mediapart, 18 June 2024, https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/politique/180624/legislatives-quinze-candidats-rn-ont-entretenu-des-liens-directs-avec-la-russie-de-poutine; Anthony Faiola and Annabelle Timsit, “In France’s rebranded far right, flashes of antisemitism and racism persist,” The Washington Post, 28 June 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/28/france-far-right-antisemitism-racism-le-pen/
[xliii] Marie-Pierre Rey, La Russie face…, p. 368.
[xliv] “Italy’s League disavows accord with Russia’s ruling party,” Reuters, 2 April 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italys-league-disavows-accord-with-russias-ruling-party-2024-04-02/
[xlv] David Cenciotti, “UK Secretary of Defence Reveals Italian Supply of Storm Shadow Missiles to Ukraine,” The Aviationist, 28 April 2024, https://theaviationist.com/2024/04/28/italian-supply-storm-shadow-missiles-ukraine/
[xlvi] Hugo Marcos-Marne, “The Spanish Radical Right under the shadow of the invasion of Ukraine,” in Giles Valdi and Emilia Zankina (eds), The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-wing Populism in Europe, Brussels: European Center for Populism Studies, 2023, pp. 291-301.
[xlvii] Terrence McCoy, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro embraced the U.S. under Trump. Now he’s in ‘solidarity’ with Russia,” The Washington Post,16 February 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/02/16/bolsonaro-putin-brazil-russia-ukraine/
[xlviii] Cloé Drieu, “Revolutionary situation in Turkestan (February 1917–February 1918),” in Sabine Dullin and alii (ed.), The Russian Revolution in Asia, London-New York: Routledge, 2021 ; Gaston Gaillard, Le Mouvement panrusse et les alllogènes, Paris: Chapelot, 1919, pp. 40-41 ; Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, New York-Oxford, Philosophical Library/George Ronald Publisher, 1952, pp. 71-75.
[xlix] Bernard Lewis, Semites and anti-Semites. An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice, New York-London: W. W. Norton & C°, 1987, pp. 36-41 and 242-244; Léon Poliakov, De l’antisionisme à l’antisémitisme, Paris : Calmann-Lévy, 1969; Arkadi Vaksberg, Stalin against the Jews, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994 (translated by Antonia Bouis).
[l] Christopher Andrew et Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB Battle for the Third World, New York, Basic Books, 2005, pp. 246-253
[li] Angus Beirvik, “The Crypto Exchange Moving Money for Criminal Gangs, Rich Russians and a Hamas-Linked Terror Group,” The Wall Street Journal, 13 October 2023, https://www.wsj.com/finance/currencies/garantex-russian-crypto-hamas-crime-sanctions-a3648357
[lii] “ IDF finding far more Russian arms in Hezbollah’s possession than expected – report,” The Times of Israel, 19 November 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-finding-far-more-russian-arms-in-hezbollahs-possession-than-expected-report/
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