By Aaron Eitan Meyer
Assessing the real target of Information Warfare
Aaron Eitan Meyer
In early April, news outlets around the world announced that Hamas had ‘quietly’[1] removed thousands of previously reported deaths from the casualty figures published by its ministry of health. In and of itself, this was not precisely news; even limited to the current conflict in Gaza predicated by Hamas’ attack on October 7, 2023, it was clear by December of that year that ‘casualty’ counts were being actively manipulated.[2]
Whether systemically conducted by Hamas or others as part of sustained information warfare campaigns or limited to this single case study, the analytical response is typically limited to identifying mis- and disinformation and seeking to publicly counteracting it accordingly. This is certainly understandable and even essential as a tactical response, but when it is limited to a stimulus-response dynamic, it is at best a small-scale reactive defense and categorically insufficient.
In this respect, sustained information warfare campaigns that are conducted as part of larger strategic plans need to be analyzed within that context.
In seeking to sow misinformation on a large scale, information warfare campaigns demonstrate irregular warfare pioneer Orde Charles Wingate’s observation that “Accuracy is the weapon of offence; inaccuracy (i.e., fixed lines, beaten zones, concentrations) of defense.”[3]
One might think that large scale misinformation campaigns are better described as inaccurate by definition; however that misses the key understanding that, when done competently and as part of a deliberate strategy, the campaigns are specifically targeted.
The tactical aims of productive information warfare campaigns are to not only reinforce specific inaccurate information,[4] but to undermine the ability and desire of those targeted to logically evaluate and process otherwise verifiable information itself. One could say that the famous fog of war can now emanate from one’s computer or phone screen.
In so doing, the campaigns fundamentally target a weak spot of the Information Age, particularly in western nations, namely the time and mental effort required to both absorb and analyze data.
Information warfare campaigns can therefore be not only tactical, but strategic. As B.H. Liddell Hart explained over 70 years ago, primarily in the kinetic warfare context, strategy is not only concerned with the movement of forces but with the effect of such movement, while its application within a conflict space is generally termed tactics.[5] Liddell Hart rightfully cautioned even then that strategy and tactics “can never be truly divided into separate compartments because each not only influences but merges into the other.”[6]
Regardless, as with other applications of Fourth Generation Warfare,[7] a properly executed information warfare campaign embodies Liddell Hart’s recommendation that military methods should focus on “the practicable object of paralysing the enemy’s action rather than the theoretical object of crushing his forces.”[8]
In turn, crafting an adequate strategic response necessitates understanding that the focus cannot be on the facial subject of the campaign, but on the specific type of paralysis that is the ultimate object of the campaign.
Put another way, if there are three domains[9] whose interplay defines how information affects our analytical ability itself, it is the “cognitive domain where many battles and wars are actually won and lost.”[10] Applying this analytical framework, information warfare campaigns are utilizing the information domain in order to target the cognitive domain. Informational counter-campaigns that engage within the information domain alone should not be expected to succeed on any level beyond the small-scale tactical response. How an adequate strategic response can be properly developed will be addressed in a subsequent article.
[1] E.g., “Hamas ‘quietly drops’ thousands of deaths from casualty figures”, The Telegraph, April 1, 2025;
“Hamas terror outlet quietly cuts Gaza death count, reveals most killed were combat-age men,” Fox News, April 6, 2025; “Hamas quietly cuts thousands from its casualty war figures,” The Australian, April 3, 2025.
[2] “The Battle Over Casualty Counts in Gaza,” Honest Reporting, December 11, 2023.
[3] Report on First Chindit Expedition, at p. 44. Copy in the author’s private collection.
[4] As opposed to narrow disinformation campaigns that may be specifically limited to suppress scrutiny of a specific issue, typically for a relatively finite period of time.
[5] Strategy, third edition 1972, at p. 335.
[6] Id.
[7] See, generally, William S. Lind, Col. Keith Nightengale, USA, Cpt. John F. Schmitt, USMC, Col. Joseph W., Sutton, USA and LtCol. Gary I. Wilson, USMC, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1989).
[8] Strategy at p. 346.
[9] Namely the Physical Domain, the Information Domain and the Cognitive Domain per David S. Alberts John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes, David A. Signori, Understanding Information Age Warfare, DoD Command and Control Research Program, second edition at pp. 10-11.
[10] Id at 11.
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